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The late Giovanni Sartori once said that we lacked a general theory of dictatorship.
It is very likely that we are also short of a theory of emergency. As the current
pandemic has come to show us, not only we still have difficulties to include
emergency into our conception of constitutional law; we seem to differ on what
emergency means and necessitates and on what should be its place in the
functioning of the democratic State. 
Since the early years of this century, emergency has been the recurrent approach in
many democracies to our most divisive collective issues, be it national security or the
financial crisis. For some, we have been living in a “permanent” state of emergency
where sensitive questions are treated as existential threats urging democracies to
fiercely defend themselves. The use of emergency as an overarching concept has
served the opposite sides of the political setting, who seem to have accepted the
normalization of the emergency in their conflicting agendas either for open reform or
contestation. 
It is not certain, however, that this view helped to understand how emergency fits
into democratic orders increasingly exposed to internal and external fractures. And
as the pandemic outbreak forces us to close down our economies and societies for
an indefinite period, our position is now somewhat of hesitation. Are we in a ‘déjà vu’
mode, or must we actually say that ‘this time is different’?
The declaration of emergency in Portugal
As already detailed here, the Portuguese President has declared the state of
emergency on 18 of march, based on the existence of a public calamity and referring
to the WHO announcement of Covid-19 as a pandemic. The President has justified
the state of emergency with a view to reinforcing the legal certainty of the overall
emergency framework, as well as with the need of new restrictive measures that are
necessary to contain the spread of the virus. 
According to the Portuguese Constitution, the state of emergency may only last
for 15 days, although it can be renewed for equal periods. The presidential decree
has enacted the “partial suspension” of certain fundamental rights: the freedom of
movement and settlement in the territory, property and economic freedom, right to
strike and some other workers' rights, cross-border circulation, rights of assembly
and demonstration, freedom of collective worship and right of resistance. In line with
what is stated in the Constitution, the decree has also defined that the emergency
could not affect the rights to life, integrity, personal identity, civil capacity and
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citizenship, non-retroactivity of the law and due process and freedom of conscience
and religion, adding to the list the freedoms of expression and information. 
Following the emergency decree as defined by the President, the Government,
which is a separate body from the President, approved a decree on 20 of march that
aims to implement the declaration. The government decree places different groups
of citizens under the duties of: i) compulsory confinement (e.g patients with COVID
19 and SARS Cov2 and citizens under active surveillance by health authorities), ii)
special protection (those over 70, and immunodepressed or persons suffering from
chronic diseases) and  iii) home retreat (all the other citizens allowed to move and
circulate only for specific purposes). Services, retailers (other than supermarkets and
groceries), and stores have been forced to close doors; telecommuting has been
made mandatory whenever functionally possible; transports were restricted or in
some cases suspended.  
Given its limited duration, the President decided to renew the state of emergency
by passing a new decree that was published on 2 of April. Besides extending the
declaration of emergency for more 15 days, the President has also authorized the
suspension of other rights (the freedoms to learn and teach and the right to data
protection), and reinforced the restrictions on freedom of movement due the Easter
period. This time, the movement of people and the risk of contagion were the only
immediate causes for the declaration. Among the reasons also mentioned by the
President are the need to ensure the capacity of the National Health Service, the
supply chains of essential goods and the well-functioning of the economy. Similarly,
the Government approved a second decree implementing the prorogation of the
emergency, which was published in the same day of the presidential decree. 
At the time of writing, both the President and the Government have announced they
will renew the state of emergency until may. 
Constitutionalizing emergency in the Portuguese
Constitution 
Leaving behind a 48-year-old dictatorship, the democratic Portuguese Constitution
of 1976 has sought to define within the constitutional order itself the procedural and
material preconditions that would enable the suspension of rights and the declaration
of the state of siege or the state of emergency. 
According to Article 19 of the Portuguese Constitution, the two states, siege and
emergency, may only be declared “in cases of actual or imminent aggression
by foreign forces, a serious threat to or disturbance of constitutional democratic
order, or public calamity”. The difference between both relates to the intensity and
seriousness of the factual preconditions. The state of emergency shall apply when
such contexts are less serious and shall only cause the suspension of some rights
and freedoms. 
In its attempt to constitutionalize emergency, the Constitution has devised a
negotiated mechanism between the three political institutions to ensure that none
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could unilaterally decide on the suspension of rights. This mechanism of mutual
control can be analysed in two moments. The first consists in the fact that, under
Article 138 of the Constitution, the declaration by the President of the state of
emergency requires prior consultation of the Government and authorisation by the
Parliament. The second is that, while Article 19 constitutes the first level of self-
control, the Constitution also requires that the procedure for declaring and executing
the state of emergency be regulated in a special law, approved by a qualified
majority. This particular law reinforces the normative framework by prescribing
the necessary content and limitations of the extraordinary measures, as well as
the division of competences between the President, Government and Parliament.
Leaving aside the question of whether the Portuguese case fits in the neo-Roman
model, it is as if the state of emergency, briefly put, would be governed under
the typical formula: the President declares, the Government executes and the
Parliament oversees.
How “open” can the emergency mandate be?
This formula, however, would be an over-simplification of the practical issues posed
by the state of emergency. In Portugal, the declaration on the state of emergency
must comply with a predetermined content, including the characterization of the
emergency and the specification of the rights that are affected. The presidential
decree provides the framework under which the Government will intervene. It is not
just a political act, but a normative one. Such framework cannot be too general, as it
is supposed to identify the purposes and necessary restrictions that will be imposed
on the selected rights. 
At the same time, it would not be possible or desirable to anticipate all the restrictive
measures the Government shall be allowed to take in order to achieve the
intended purposes behind the emergency. The power of the President is not solely
declarative, and the Government’s position is also not of just of an executor. In its
constructive, selective, often tailor-made activity of transposing the presidential
framework into the reality of the concrete emergency, the Government has a large
capacity to choose the best means of intervention.  
A close comparison in Portugal between the declaration of emergency by the
President and the implementing decrees by the Government, as well as the
emergency legislation that has been adopted, would provide useful lessons in this
regard. For example, while the declaration of emergency has broadly permitted the
shutdown of businesses, units or economic activities, the Government has reinforced
that the shutdown cannot be used as a basis for termination of non-housing lease
agreements or other contracts related to the buildings. In another example, the
President has decreed on the suspension of freedom of movement and cross-border
circulation, while the Government came to identify the situation of each means of
transportation, by ordering the reduction of the number of passengers to one third of
the seats. 
It would be easy to continue with more examples. The initial decree by the President
made no reference to the closure of elementary and secondary schools, but still the
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Government has decided to take the measure. On the other hand, the declaration
has authorized the possibility of requesting buildings, goods or equipment from the
private sector, which the Government so far has not used. Also, due to the severe
impact that the suspension of economic activity brings to companies and families,
the Government has been adopting various forms of social and economic support,
which don’t entirely fit within the walls of the legal emergency. 
The question then is not how open the presidential declaration of emergency can be,
because it has to be inherently open. What needs to be asked is how are we able to
cope with the extensive emergency powers that must necessarily be granted to the
Government. Of course, the intervention of the executive in responding to the state
of emergency cannot be the product of unlimited power and must be appropriately
conformed by limitations and constitutional principles. 
Between the restoration and recreation of normality
In the model of the constitutionalized emergency, the whole purpose is to tie up
both its declaration and implementation to a paradigm of constitutional self-defence,
which explains the limitations that apply to it: its temporary nature, the fact that the
most basic rights may not be affected, the respect for the principle of proportionality
and the division of powers, and the duty stated in the Constitution to promptly
restore the constitutional normality. In legal terms, the restoration of constitutional
normality would have a precise meaning: once the suspension of the right ceases,
the norm of fundamental rights returns to its original effects and citizens are again in
possession of the right without the limitations. Once the anomalous fact disappears
or is eliminated, normality may return.  
This idealized view of the state of emergency in Constitutional law suffers, however,
from two related problems. As already discussed, it is misleading to describe the
emergency lawmaker as a mere restorer. There’s no normality when the emergency
generates a loss that cannot be restored. The suspension of freedom of movement
affects the freedom to produce and the freedom to work. Businesses and workers
are prevented from returning to a normality that has been profoundly altered in the
course of the emergency. This doesn’t mean the emergency requires forms of action
outside the Constitution. On the contrary, it is the basis for providing support to
citizens and companies in order to protect other fundamental rights and principles.
Because of this, despite being contained by the constitutional arrangements and
the separation of powers, emergency is never simply defensive. It is protective and
creative. States are not limited to suspending rights. They are expected to increase
the protection of citizens, secure rights, empower their positions, and they often try
to accomplish these things through the creation of exceptional rules and inventive
procedures. How transformative can states be in dealing with the emergency under
the emergency, that is, with the abnormality that penetrated the lives of citizens as
a result of the pandemic? Which rescue or protection measures to be taken? Soon,
as the situation of the disease improves, stronger measures will be replaced by
lighter ones, thus ending with the state of emergency. However, many exceptional
measures that have been adopted will remain and they will derive their validity
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from other norms. These are questions that illustrate why states acting under the
emergency require a permanent justification that preserves its legitimacy. It is also a
reminder that the creative emergency is to be legally addressed, and not forgotten.
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